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We analyse the impact of relaxing rules of origin (ROOs) in a simple setting with heterogeneous
￿rms that buy intermediate inputs from domestic and foreign sources. In particular, we consider
the impact of switching from bilateral to diagonal cumulation when using preferences (instead
of paying the MFN tari⁄) involving the respect of rules of origin. We ￿nd that relaxing the
restrictiveness of the ROOs leads the least productive exporters to stop exporting. The empirical
part con￿rms these results. We use the most recent techniques developed by Helpman, Melitz
and Rubinstein (2007) on highly disaggregated data (HS6 digit) to analyse the e⁄ects of the
introduction of the Pan-European Cumulation System (PECS). We ￿nd that PECS reverses the
negative impact of strict ROOs on intermediate trade which turns positive as a consequence of
introducing diagonal ROCs.
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11 Introduction
Rules of origin and rules of cumulation are unavoidable parts of preferential regimes. They characterize
unilateral trade preferences and free trade areas, FTAs. Rules of origin (henceforth ROOs), by deter-
mining the origin of a product, de￿ne whether a good quali￿es or not for preferential access. Rules of
cumulation (henceforth ROCs) de￿ne whether a ￿rm can use imported intermediate products, so that
the ￿nal product of the importing ￿rm does not loose the originating status. A preferential regime
can allow either for bilateral, diagonal or full cumulation. To qualify its ￿nal product for preferential
access with bilateral cumulation1, a ￿rm can either use the domestic intermediates or the intermedi-
ates produced in a preference receiving country. Whereas, with diagonal cumulation, a ￿rm can use
the intermediate goods coming from any of the preferential regime partners produced under the same
ROOs and ROCs. Alternatively, a preferential regime can allow for full cumulation. In this case all
the intermediates coming from free trade area partners can be used, regardless of the fact that the
imported products qualify or not for preferential access.
Despite that rules of origin are formulated in a context of preferential trade liberalization, their
e⁄ects on trade ￿ ows are rather ambiguous. More precisely, they can either prevent exporters from
taking advantage of the preferential tari⁄ or they can constitute a trade diverting factor. Indeed, as
argued by Krishna (2005), much of what we have learnt from the literature is that ROOs can provide
hidden protection for intermediate inputs and that the e⁄ect of rules of origin in the short run may be
primarily in terms of trade ￿ ows while in the long run it may take the form of investment ￿ ows. On the
other hand, as highlighted by Baldwin, Evenett and Low (2007) "permissive ROCs can mitigate the
protectionist content of ROOs by expanding ￿rms￿choice when it comes to their international supply
networks".
The aim of this paper is to focus on the issue of bilateral versus diagonal or full cumulation. Our
paper contributes to the literature by analyzing the combined e⁄ect of ROOs and ROCs. To show
that bilateral cumulation, as opposed to diagonal or full cumulation, can distort the purchase pattern
of intermediate inputs, we model ROOs and ROCs by incorporating the Puga and Venables (1995)
model into the Melitz framework using a three country setting. Puga and Venables (1995) show that
in a model with a preferential trading arrangement between hub and spoke countries the hub-spoke
arrangement lead to the relocation of industry into the hub country. However, as shown by Demidova,
Krisna and Loo Kee (2006), a homogeneous ￿rm setting cannot take into account important results
1We also refer to this set up as restrictive ROOs.
2due to di⁄erent trade policies. Indeed, Demidova,Krisna and Loo Kee (2006) build a heterogeneous
￿rm setting which shows that ￿rms sort according to the export markets and to the di⁄erent types of
trade policy. They model the response of Bangladesh ￿rms in two sectors, the woven and no woven
sectors, with respect to the decision of exporting to the EU market, under the "Everything But Arms"
(EBA) initiative and to the US market, under the quota regime. In both cases ￿rms can take advantage
of these trade policies only if they comply with ROOs. Modelling ROOs as an additional marginal
and ￿xed cost they show that ￿rms that take advantage of the less restrictive EU￿ s ROOs are less
productive than those ￿rms that export to the US, where tari⁄s are higher.
In our model we close the gap between these two models. On the one hand, we allow for di⁄erent
￿rms responses. Firms can decide to invoke preferential tari⁄s and thus, comply with rules of origin. A
su¢ cient condition ensures the existence of di⁄erent types of responses. On the other hand, di⁄erently
from Demidova, Krisna and Loo Kee (2006), we model the implications of ROOs by introducing an
intermediate good sector in a three countries model. This enables us to we investigate the e⁄ects of
ROOs on the intermediate sector and on the trade between the two spokes countries. Finally, we look
at the implications of diagonal ROCs on intermediate and ￿nal sectors.
To con￿rm our theoretical predictions, we bring the model to the data. The natural experiment is to
consider the Pan European system of cumulation. The system introduced in 1997 has allowed the major
part of the European Union￿ s free trade partners to cumulate stages of production in order to qualify
for preferential access in the European market. Since the literature that examines the combined e⁄ects
of rules of origin and rules of cumulation on supply choice is rather scarce, our empirical purpose is to
shed light on the restrictive nature of ROOs and on the role of ROCs in mitigating the protectionist
content of ROOs. To do so, we use an index of restrictiveness of Product Speci￿c Rules of Origin
constructed by Cadot, CarrŁre, de Melo and Tumurchudur (2005). Their latter paper shows that rules
of origin tend to be more restrictive for activities with greater processing (i.e. lower value added),
and that non-least developing countries face restrictive ROOs in sectors in which they have a revealed
comparative advantage (in the sense of high export shares).
To examine the impact of the relaxation of ROOs in the European context, Augier, Lai-Tong
and Gasiorek (2007) consider the European Union Mediterranean Partneship and the Pan European
system of cumulation. First they establish whether there is any evidence on the impact of cumulation
from the trade data following the introduction of the Pan European system in 1997, which extended
diagonal cumulation to the Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states. They show that both
3at the aggregate and sectoral level the relaxation of rules of origin via the introduction of diagonal
cumulation arrangements between the EU and its￿trading partners generates positive e⁄ects.
In line with this research is the paper by Anson, Cadot, Estevadeordal, de Melo, Suwa-Eisenmann
and Tumurchudur (2004), which studies the impact of ROOs on trade ￿ ows in the case of NAFTA.
They argue that these may be representative of a North-South FTA. They ￿nd that the restrictiveness
nature of ROOs impacts negatively on trade ￿ ows. They predict that in absence of tari⁄ change,
the application of rules of origin lead ￿nal good producers to shift their purchases of intermediates to
intra-FTA intermediates. Additionally if ￿nal goods are imperfect substitutes by origin, consumers
will shift towards intra-FTA from rest of the world (ROW) trade if the bene￿ts of complying with
rules of origin are greater than zero.
The contribution of our paper is as follows. Absent ROCs, our model generates a hub spoke
situation. This result is less strong than the situation predicted by the Puga-Venables (1995) framework
due to the presence of the heterogeneous ￿rms setting. Moreover, absent ROCs, ￿rms in the spoke
sort according to the ability of respecting rules of origin. This is line with the predictions of Krishna,
Demidova and Loo Kee (2006). Di⁄erently from them we explicitly model the constraints imposed by
rules of origin introducing an intermediate production sector. An important aspect of our paper is
that we consider the situation in which diagonal ROCs are allowed between the spoke countries. Our
model shows that ROCs do mitigate the e⁄ect of ROOs by leading countries to a situation that is
closer to a free trade situation.
In the empirical part we analyze how the extensive and intensive margins of trade are a⁄ected by
ROOs and ROCs. More speci￿cally, we follow the Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) gravity
equation which brings the heterogeneous ￿rm model to the data and allows to analyze the e⁄ect on
the extensive margin and intensive margin of trade correcting for the presence of zero trade ￿ ows. We
disentangle trade ￿ ows by looking separately at the trade among the EU 15 and the EFTA, BAFTA,
CEFTA and MED countries and by distinguishing the e⁄ects of ROOs and ROCs on the trade of
both the intermediate and ￿nal goods2. We show that diagonal cumulation relaxes ROOs particularly
for the Spoke countries. Whilst ROOs under bilateral cumulation decrease intermediate export from
Spoke to Spoke countries, diagonal cumulation reverts this negative e⁄ect leading to trade creation
inside the Pan European cumulation zone. Spoke countries seem to have gained the most by the
possibility to cumulate. For the EU 15, ROOs under bilateral cumulation lead to a decrease both
2See Appendix A.5. for details on Countries.
4at the extensive and intensive margin in the export of intermediate goods and to an increase in the
export of the ￿nal good. The introduction of cumulation accentuates these e⁄ects. The only exception
concerns the e⁄ect of diagonal cumulation on the export of the intermediate good from the EU 15.
Speci￿cally, for the EU 15, the probability of exporting the intermediate good decreases while the
volume of trade increases. This e⁄ect is con￿rmed by the robustness check. These results suggest
that the FTAs have been used to reorganized production inside the European Union spaghetti bowl.
Cumulation has increased the incentive to split the value chain of production among all the EU FTA
partners, with the EU 15 shifting the intermediate stages of production to the peripheral countries
and with a consequent increase in intra-￿rm trade. As far as we know there are no other papers that
apply the Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (henceforth HMR) gravity equation using the Harmonised
System (HS) 1992, which categorizes trade ￿ ow along 5019 tari⁄ lines.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section presents a brief overview of the evidence
on trade and ROOs. Section three sets up the model and derives partial equilibrium results. Section
four characterizes the equilibrium and investigates some comparative statics. In section ￿ve are dis-
cussed the main features of the Pan European system of cumulation, the empirical strategy and the
results. The last section concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
We study the e⁄ect of a FTA with rules of origin and bilateral cumulation between a hub and two
spoke countries. The preferential access to the FTA partner￿ s market requires that ￿rms comply with
ROOs and bilateral ROCs. Compliance with these rules restricts the possibility of using intermediate
goods from the other spoke country. Rather than adopting a partial restriction in the use of inputs,
we make the strong assumption that only intermediates from the origin and destination markets can
be used when exporting under preferential tari⁄. This assumption captures the essence of ROOs with
bilateral cumulation, whose e⁄ects are essentially on the inputs￿choices made by ￿nal good producers.
As such, our assumption does not a⁄ect the main message behind the model and it allows to keep the
analysis as simple as possible3. For instance, EU rules of origin for cotton clothing stipulate that the
manufacturing process must ￿ manufacture from yarn￿ , implying that imported cotton fabric cannot be
used and that the yarn must be sourced locally4.
3This assumption does not a⁄ect the general results.
4For many small developing countries this rule is very di¢ cult to satisfy and often precludes the use of preferential
access to the EU market under the GSP.
5The main value of our theory and key to our empirics lies in the consideration of changes in rules
of cumulations. Speci￿cally, to explore the role of cumulation in reducing the distortionary impact
of preferential ROOs, we investigate the changes induced by the possibility of diagonal cumulation
between the spoke countries.
2.1 Preferences
Consumers in each country share the same preferences over two ￿nal goods: a homogeneous good, z,
and a di⁄erentiated good, x. We assume a two-tier preference with Cobb-Douglas in the upper tier and
CES in the lower tier. A fraction of income, ￿, is spent on the di⁄erentiated good, x, and a fraction








where ￿ > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution between any two products within the group and
V is the set of available varieties. Given that preferences across varieties have the standard CES form,








where c = o;d , o stands for origin and d for destination; pf;c (v) is the ￿nal price of a variety v, P
1￿￿
f;c
is the CES price index for the ￿nal good and ￿E is the aggregate level of spending on the di⁄erentiated
good.
2.2 Technology and market structure
We focus on the e⁄ects of ROOs with bilateral cumulation on supply networks. For this reason, the
set-up of the model is based on three identical countries: a hub country and two spoke countries.
Each country is endowed with labor, L, which is supplied inelastically. There are three sectors, one
homogeneous, one manufacturing sector and one di⁄erentiated intermediate good sector. The homo-
geneous sector produces a good, z, with constant returns to scale and perfect competition. In this
sector the technology is simple. We choose units of z such that one unit of labor is required per unit of
output. Thus, the unit cost function is w, where w is the wage rate for labor. This unit cost function
6represents marginal and average costs. In the homogeneous sector, competition implies price equal
marginal costs, pz = w. It is convenient to choose good z as the numeraire, so that pz = 1; hence,
the pricing condition will become: 1 = w. As long as the homogeneous good z is produced in every
country and is freely traded on international markets, the cost of producing this homogenous good is
the same in every country, and hence, so are the wages.
The manufacturing sector produces a continuum of horizontally di⁄erentiated varieties, x(v), ￿ la
Melitz. These varieties are produced using labour, L, and a CES composite of intermediate inputs.
These two factors are combined in a Cobb-Douglas production function, which gives the following unit
variable cost a(v)P
￿
M, where a(v) is the unit input requirement, PM is the price index of the composite
intermediate goods, M, and ￿ is the Cobb-Douglas cost share of the intermediate bundle. We assume
that each spoke country signs a FTA with the hub country. The existence of the FTA allows the
￿rms to choose between two tari⁄s. One is the non-discriminatory tari⁄, called ￿ most favoured nation￿
tari⁄, which provides the handy abbreviation, MFN. This tari⁄ equals to ￿MFN ￿1, where ￿MFN ￿ 1
represents the cost of selling one unit in the export market. Since between the two spoke countries
there is no FTA the only tari⁄ which applies is the MFN tari⁄. On the contrary, FTA partners make
use of the preferential tari⁄, ￿FTA < ￿MFN, subject to the respect of rules of origin which a⁄ects the
choice of the intermediate good sector.
The di⁄erentiated intermediate good sector produces a continuum of horizontally di⁄erentiated
varieties, m(i), i 2 [0;:::;1], in a Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition setting, using only labour5.
It follows that the pricing rule of each intermediate good producer is
pm = ￿￿=(￿ ￿ 1) (2)
where pm is the price of the m good, ￿ is the unit input requirement. For simplicity, we assume that
the intermediate good ￿rms are homogeneous and their trade frictionless6. This strong assumption
allows us to keep the analysis as simple as possible without a⁄ecting the main results. Given that
￿nal good preferences are Cobb Douglas and nations are symmetric, each nation will devote the same
amount of labour to intermediate good production. Hence, the mass of intermediate good varieties is
the same across nations and equal to nM. The standard CES price index for the intermediate good
5Following Puga and Venables (1995), we assume the same elasticty of substitution across varieties, ￿, for both the
intermediate and the ￿nal good sectors.
6It does not make any di⁄erence whether we consider or not heterogeneous ￿rms even in the intermediate sector.





where n = ￿E=￿f is the equilibrium number of intermediate good varieties produced in each country
and f is the Dixit-Stiglitz ￿xed cost of production.
The introduction of these restrictive rules of origin make ￿rms face a fundamental trade-o⁄between
optimizing intermediate good source and having access to the preferential tari⁄. To capture this key
trade-o⁄, while maintaining analytical tractability, we make the bold assumption that the restrictive
ROOs take the form of an absolute prohibition on using intermediate varieties from non partner





rather than (3). Given our assumptions, we can ￿nd closed form solutions for (4) and (3). This shows
that ￿rms face a trade-o⁄ between the e¢ ciency in production and preferential tari⁄ for ￿nal good.
The homogeneous sector is not subject to trade costs as well as the intermediate good sector.
More speci￿cally, we assume a frictionless world for these sectors which allows us to keep the analysis
as simple as possible without a⁄ecting the main results. Given this set-up, it follows that a certain
number of ￿nal good producers will sell only domestically (D-type ￿rms) and a sub-sample of them,
the more productive ones, will also export to the other markets (X-type ￿rms).
Concerning the intermediate good producers, their supply will depend on the demand of ￿nal good
producers. As we describe in the next subsection, this, in turn, depends on the ￿nal good producers￿
decision to comply or not with ROOs and bilateral ROCs.
Introducing FTA with ROOs
The main value added of our theory is to deal with ROOs and bilateral cumulation (also called
restrictive ROOs). We assume that each spoke country signs a FTA with the hub country. The
existence of the FTA allows the ￿rms to choose between two export strategies. A ￿rm that wants the
preferential tari⁄, ￿FTA < ￿MFN, has to respect the restriction imposed by the ROOs and bilateral
cumulation. This implies that the ￿rm that invokes preference for exporting in the hub (spoke) market
can only use the intermediate input-varieties produced in its own domestic market and in the spoke
8(hub) country involved in the speci￿c FTA. Moreover, ROO imposes a ￿xed cost, fR. This ￿xed cost is
the sum of the market entry cost, fX, plus the administrative costs linked to the proof of originating
status. When a ￿rm decides to respect these restrictions, it will face a larger ￿xed costs and a restricted
choice of inputs but a lower tari⁄, ￿FTA < ￿MFN. On the contrary, refusing the preferential access
implies that the ￿rm can exploit a greater range of intermediate inputs, a lower ￿xed cost but a higher
tari⁄. The trade o⁄ between asking or not for preferential access is due to the ￿xed and intermediate
input costs versus the preferential tari⁄.
The introduction of a FTA with ROO and bilateral cumulation will generate two types of exporting
￿rms. A certain number of exporting ￿rms will not ful￿l the restrictive ROOs. Hence, they will not
receive the preferential access. We call these ￿rms X-type ￿rms. On the other hand, there will be
another fraction of exporting ￿rms, which ful￿l the restrictive ROOs. We call these ￿rms R-type ￿rms.
2.3 Intermediate Results
2.3.1 Market entry decision of ￿nal good ￿rms
Following Melitz (2003) and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), entering the ￿nal good sector in-
volves a ￿xed variety-development cost fI
7. Subsequently, each entrant draws a labor per-unit-output
coe¢ cient (called a) from a cumulative density function G[a], that is common to every country. The
support of the continuous random variable a is 0 ￿ a ￿ a0. Upon drawing its own parameter a, each
￿rm decides to exit and not to produce (this happens if it has a low productivity draw), or to produce.
If it chooses to produce for its own domestic market, it pays the additional ￿xed market entry cost,
fD. If the ￿rm chooses to export, without invoking preferential tari⁄, it bears the additional market
entry costs fX. If the ￿rm decides to respect the restrictive ROO, it faces a ￿xed cost, fR. This
￿xed cost is the sum of the market entry cost, fX, plus the administrative costs linked to the proof of
originating status8. It follows that the ￿xed cost fR, which provides preferential market access, will
be more attractive to larger ￿rms.
When a ￿rm decides to respect the restrictive ROOs, it will face a larger ￿xed costs, a restricted
choice of inputs but a lower tari⁄, ￿FTA < ￿MFN . On the contrary, refusing the preferential access
implies that the ￿rm can exploit a greater range of intermediate inputs, a lower ￿xed cost but a higher
tari⁄. The trade o⁄ between asking or not for preferential access is due to the ￿xed and intermediate
7Where the subscript I stands for innovation.
8All the ￿xed cost are in terms of labor.
9input costs versus the preferential tari⁄. Hence, the introduction of a FTA with restrictive ROOs will
generate two types of exporting ￿rms.
Solving for the cost minimization problem, the pro￿t function for D-type ￿rms, for which ROOs
are irrelevant, is equal to pD (v)x(v)￿x(v)a(v)P
￿
M ￿fD. The pricing rule that follows from the pro￿t
maximization is pD = a(v)P
￿
M￿=(￿ ￿ 1). Using the intermediate results from consumer and ￿rms￿
















The modes of export vary according to the considered foreign market. In the case of a FTA partner,
a ￿rm, in the origin country, can choose between two possible export strategies, which are related to
the ful￿lment of restrictive rules of origin. If a ￿rm decides to respect ROO and bilateral cumulation,
































The introduction of FTA with ROO induces a sorting of exporting ￿rms into two groups. The ￿rst
group decides to ful￿l ROOs in order to enjoy the preferential access (5). The second group, instead,
is characterized by the ￿rms that decide to not accept the ROO and therefore the preferential access
(6). Comparing equation (5) with (6), ￿rms that ful￿l ROO and bilateral cumulation face a higher
intermediate good Price Index, P
￿
M;Roo, a higher ￿xed cost, fR, but a lower tari⁄, ￿FTA ￿1. For what
concern the trade between the two spoke countries, since there is no agreement, the equilibrium pro￿t
for exporting will be always represented by (6).
Rearranging terms and de￿ning ￿ = P
￿(1￿￿)
M and ￿ = P
￿(1￿￿)
M;Roo , we can rewrite the equilibrium
pro￿ts from domestic sales as9:
￿o
D(a) = ￿Boa1￿￿ ￿ fD (7)
where Bo = A=P
1￿￿
f;o and A = (￿E=￿)(￿=1 ￿ ￿)
1￿￿.
9Note: Bo = A=B
10If a ￿rm chooses to export, without ful￿lling ROOs, then its equilibrium net operating pro￿t in
that market is:
￿d
X(a) = ￿a1￿￿Bd￿MFN ￿ fX (8)
where ￿MFN = ￿
1￿￿
MFN and Bd = A=P
1￿￿
f;d .
If a ￿rm chooses to export ful￿lling ROOs, the equilibrium net operating pro￿t is:
￿d
R(a) = ￿a1￿￿Bd￿FTA ￿ fR (9)
where ￿FTA = ￿
1￿￿
FTA:
Due to the assumptions underlying the model, ￿rms will be ranked according to the following
regularity condition:
￿￿1fD < (￿￿MFN)
￿1 fX < (￿￿FTA)
￿1 fR
this condition implies that the exporting pro￿t functions, (8) and (9), will cross in a point, beyond
which serving the FTA partner using rules of origin is pro￿table10.















10More details are given in Appendix A.1
11From Figure 1, we can see that there is a trade o⁄ between the preferential tari⁄, which o⁄ers
a better market access, and the costs associated with respecting the originating status requirements.
The costs associated with originating status refer to a high price for the intermediate goods and a high
￿xed cost. Restrictive ROO constrains the sourcing decision of the ￿nal good ￿rms and it increases
the ￿xed cost associated with exports. It follows that only large exporters can take advantage of a
better market access while the small exporting ￿rms, not able to cope with the higher costs, have to
renounce to the preferential access.
In sum the model has three cut-o⁄s which derive from the regularity condition, described previously.
Namely, looking at Figure 1, least e¢ cient ￿rms exit, a(v) > aD, most ￿rms sell only locally, aX <
a(v) < aD, and some ￿rms export but using the MFN tari⁄, aRoo < a(v) < aX, while most productive
exporters respect ROO and gain tari⁄ preference, a(v) ￿ aR.
3 Equilibrium Conditions
We now formalize the statements illustrated in Figure 1.
3.0.2 The Cuto⁄ Conditions
Let us de￿ne the threshold marginal costs for each market. Using the equilibrium operating pro￿t for








That is ￿rms with a(v) below aD ￿nd it optimal to supply the local market while ￿rms with a(v) > aD
expect negative pro￿ts and exit the industry.
The choice in the case of the foreign markets is more complex, so it could be helpful to structure the
discussion with the help of Figure 1. As we see from the ￿gure the net operating pro￿ts of supplying
the foreign market rises under both modes of exporting. Firms with aX < a(v) < aD have positive
operating pro￿ts from sales in the domestic market, but they lose money if they choose to serve foreign
markets. We use the net operating pro￿t from exporting under MFN (8) to derive the X-type ￿rm









Thus, only ￿rms with a(v) ￿ aX will consider export to the other spoke country and to the hub market
when ROO are not ful￿lled.
Notice, from Figure 1, that at a(v) = aX, exporting without ROO yields a higher net operating
pro￿t then exporting with ROO. This ordering switches, however, for ￿rms with a(v) ￿ aRoo, where








This last cuto⁄ is obtained by equating the operating pro￿ts from accepting ROO, (9) with the oper-
ating pro￿t from doing export under MFN tari⁄, (8). This because by construction, a ￿rm will choose
to supply by accepting ROO only if the ROO strategy is more pro￿table than the export strategy
under MFN, i.e. if this holds:
￿d
R ￿ ￿d
X ￿ fR ￿ fX
which can be rewritten as,
Bda
1￿￿
R [￿￿FTA ￿ ￿￿MFN] = fR ￿ fX
Notice that if a(v) ￿ aR, the export supply ful￿lling ROO yields a higher net operating pro￿t.
From the diagram it is clear that aX > aR. This implies that only the large exporters will use the
preferential access while small exporters will continue to use the MFN tari⁄.
Free Entry
In order to characterize the general equilibrium results, we specify the free entry conditions and the
Price Indexes of the ￿nal good sector.
Free entry ensures equality between the expected operating pro￿ts of a potential entrant and the
entry cost, E (￿) ￿ fI. This condition holds for all type of ￿rms. The cumulative density function is
G(a), with support: [0;::: ;a0], where for simplicity we can set a0 = 1: The free entry condition for a
















XdG(a) = fI (13)













RdG(a) = fI (14)
Note that the cuto⁄ aX_hs as well as aX_sh represent the threshold marginal cost of exporting ￿rms
which do not export under ROOs.
Price Index





























































3.0.3 Parametrization: Pareto Distribution
In order to ￿nd closed form solutions, we use a speci￿c parametrization for the distribution, the Pareto
distribution, whose empirical importance has been proved (see Axtell 2001; Helpman et al. 2004; Del







where k and a0 are the shape and scale parameter, respectively. The shape parameter k represents
the dispersion of cost draws. An increase in k would imply a reduction in the dispersion of ￿rm
productivity-draws. Hence, the higher is k the smaller is the amount of heterogeneity11.
We assume that the support of the distribution [0;:::;a0], where a0 represents the upper bound of
this distribution, is identical for every country. The properties of the Pareto distributions lead to a
productivity distribution of surviving ￿rms which is also Pareto with shape k. More precisely, since a
￿rm will start producing only if it has at least a productivity of 1=aD, the probability distribution of
supplying as an exporter is conditioned on the probability of successful entry in each market. Hence






where the fractal nature of the Pareto is exploited. Here the support is [0;:::;aD]. Given the assumed
parametrization, we can explicitly solve the free entry conditions and the Price Index of the ￿nal
good12.
4 General Equilibrium Analysis
We analyze the main implications of our model, by looking at the results obtained for the hub and one
of the two spoke countries. We analyze one spoke country since we have assumed perfect symmetry
between the two spokes. In Appendix A.2, we present the closed form solutions of the demand shifter
(Bd and Bo), the corresponding equilibrium cut-o⁄s and the number of varieties.
We turn now to comparative statics. We ￿rst look at the impact of a free trade area with restrictive
ROOs. Afterwards, we relax the restrictiveness of ROOs by allowing diagonal cumulation among the
countries.
11Note that k=1 implies a uniform distribution on [0;a0].
12See Appendix A.2
154.1 The Impact of Restrictive ROOs
In line with Krishna, Demidova and Loo Kee (2006), we ￿nd that the introduction of ROOs with
bilateral cumulation results in a reduction of the aggregate productivity in both the hub and the
spokes. Firms sort in three groups: domestic ￿rms, exporting ￿rms which do not ful￿l ROOs and
exporting ￿rms which do ful￿l ROOs.
4.2 The Impact of Relaxing ROOs via Diagonal Cumulation
To analyse the role of cumulation in reducing the distortionary impact of restrictive ROOs, we give a
graphical intuition of the e⁄ect of diagonal cumulation on ￿rms￿productivity. Then we present a more
general discussion of the impact of ROOs with diagonal cumulation in the hub and spoke situation.
Graphical Intuition. To build intuition we can use a partial equilibrium version of Figure 1, where

















Figure 2 represents the passage from ROOs and bilateral cumulation to diagonal cumulation con-
sidering only the e⁄ect on the price index of intermediate goods. As a result of the relaxation of
ROOs, the price index of intermediates when ￿rms undertake diagonal cumulation becomes identical
16to the standard CES price index for the intermediate. Hence: ￿ = ￿13. ￿
0
R and ￿R represent the
situation with and without diagonal cumulation. The relaxation of ROOs, which makes the pro￿t line
￿
0
R steeper than ￿R, reduces the threshold productivity required to export under ROOs.
General Equilibrium Analysis of ROOs and Diagonal Cumulation. In what follows we con-
sider the general impact of diagonal cumulation, which passes through the price index of intermediate
goods as well as the B￿ s. As mentioned, the introduction of cumulation reduces the price of the inter-
mediate input bundle, which now becomes the same for every ￿nal good producers and is equal to ￿.
This means that the ￿nal good producers that ask for preferential access face now a lower intermediate
price index. This in turn, allows them to charge a lower price, altering competition in both markets.
The increase in competition changes the ￿nal outcomes.
The lowering of prices by the e¢ cient ￿rms will lower the demand shifter faced by all ￿rms. This
will force out the marginal D-type (i.e. lower aD). It will also force the marginal exporters to stop
exporting (i.e. aX will fall). The impact on export productivity is slightly more subtle than in Melitz
(2003) since the diagonal cumulation lowers intermediate input costs for some ￿rms as well as drives
out the least e¢ cient ones. Unlike in Melitz (2003), trade liberalization drives some exporters to stop
exporting since the liberalization only favours the most e¢ cient ￿rms.
In summary, relaxing ROOs via diagonal cumulation leads to three e⁄ects for the ￿nal good pro-
ducers. First, least e¢ cient ￿rms are driven out from the market. Thus, the average productivity
of the countries increases. Second, since the restriction on the intermediate good is relaxed, a larger
range of exporting ￿rms ask for preferential access (i.e. aR will increase). Hence, the possibility of
diagonal cumulation allows a larger number of exporting ￿rms to take advantage of the FTA. Lastly,
least productive exporters stop supplying the foreign markets.
Although it is not formalized in the model, it is possible to deduce the impact of diagonal cumulation
on outside countries. As a consequence of increased competition within the hub and spoke countries,
it is possible to predict that outsider exporters ￿nd it more di¢ cult to supply the FTA partner.
Number of Firms. As a result of diagonal cumulation the total number of active ￿rms is declining
in both the hub and spoke countries. This is due to the increased level of competition.
13See Appendix A.3. for details.
174.3 Testable Implications: Extensive and Intensive Margins.
The results of this model yield a set of testable predictions concerning the productivity level, the
number of ￿rms, the extensive and the intensive margins of R-type and X-type ￿rms14. In what
follows we focus mainly on the extensive and the intensive margins of exports.
Testable Implication 1. Diagonal cumulation leads to an increase in the number of ￿rms exporting
from the hub to the spoke, and from the spoke to the hub, and to a decrease in the number of ￿rms
exporting among the spokes. This last result di⁄ers from what we ￿nd in the empirical part (where the
extensive margin is positive). However, we should keep in mind that in the empirical part we mainly
consider preferential trade among spokes, so we do not capture trade under MFN.
The number of varieties exported increases for the hub-spoke and spoke-hub trade because the
relaxation of ROOs makes cheaper intermediate goods available without renouncing to the preference.
On the other hand, the number of varieties exported decreases for the spokes, because few ￿rms will
now choose to export under MFN. Since we model the intermediate sector as homogeneous, we do not
have any theoretical prediction regarding the intermediate good.
Testable Implication 2. Diagonal cumulation leads to an increase in the intensive margin of the
￿nal good exported from the hub to the spoke, from the spoke to the hub and among the spokes. The
relaxation of ROOs is increasing the value of trade.
4.4 Welfare E⁄ects of Trade Liberalization
From the indirect utility function we can examine the welfare of consumers. Since the indirect utility
function15 is given by V = ￿E=P, where P is the standard CES price index, we can examine the
welfare e⁄ects simply by examining how P is changing. A greater openness will increase the welfare
by lowering the price index16, as well as a decrease in the domestic cuto⁄.
W/P?
14See Appendix A.4. for derivations.
15Without loss of generality, in this welfare analysis we are only concerned about the di⁄erentiated good.
16It can nevertheless happen that when trade costs are high and the number of foreign activities is strictly greater
than the number of domestic ￿rms, the e⁄ect of product varieties on welfare is negative (Melitz, 2002).
185 Empirical Framework
Our theoretical model predicts that diagonal cumulation relaxes ROOs leading to di⁄erent e⁄ects
among hub and spokes countries. Following our model, we ￿nd that relaxing the restrictive nature of
ROOs induces an increase in the extensive and intensive margins of the ￿nal good for both the hub
and the spoke.
Since we model the intermediate sector following the standard Krugman 1980, we do not have any
predictions on the extensive and intensive margins of the intermediates. However, it is straightforward
that in our model the introduction of diagonal cumulation leads to an increase in the extensive and
intensive margin of the intermediate good for the spoke countries. Instead, for the hub countries, it is
more di¢ cult to make a clear prediction. Thus, we rely on the empirical model to identify the e⁄ect
of cumulation on the intermediate good export.
We expect the following results. Firstly, following our theoretical predictions, we expect diagonal
cumulation to increase the hub exports of the ￿nal good. The e⁄ects of diagonal cumulation are less
straightforward for the intermediates. Indeed, on one hand diagonal cumulation reduces the protection
granted to the hub intermediate producers; on the other hand the higher number of ￿rms in the world
might increase the demand for the intermediate. Secondly, diagonal cumulation increases spoke exports
in both the intermediate and ￿nal good. Thirdly, for what concern the spoke-spoke trade, we expect
that spoke-spoke exports increase as well. Finally, in line with our theoretical model, we expect that
relaxing ROOs has the same e⁄ect on the extensive and intensive margin of trade for the ￿nal good.
In what follows, we propose an empirical investigation of the e⁄ect of relaxing ROOs. More
precisely, to test the predictions of the model, we look at the impact of diagonal cumulation taking
as a natural experiment the Pan-European Cumulation System (PECS). The system introduced in
1997, has allowed the major part of the EU 15 FTA partners to cumulate stages of production in
order to qualify for preferential access in the European market. Over the years the EU 15 signed
di⁄erent FTAs with EFTA, BAFTA, CEFTA and Med countries. ROOs with bilateral cumulation
established that countries not belonging to the same FTA could not cumulate among each other if they
wanted to export via preferential tari⁄ to the EU 15 market. After 1997, the introduction of PECS
relaxes the restrictive nature of ROOs. Indeed, countries are now allowed to diagonally cumulate while
maintaining the originating status to the EU 15. To cumulate, the PECS countries need to be linked
by FTA agreements which should include the Pan Euro Mediterranean protocol of origin. Among
EFTA, BAFTA, CEFTA and Med countries these protocols have entered into force in di⁄erent years
19according to the country under consideration, leading to di⁄erent possibility of cumulation. The EU 15
and the EFTA countries were the only members able to diagonally cumulate with all the Pan European
nations by the end of 1997.
To analyze how the extensive and intensive margins of trade are a⁄ected by ROOs and ROCs, we
consider the trade pattern among the EU 15, BAFTA, CEFTA, EFTA and MED countries during
the 1995-2002. The estimation results will identify the pattern of export among the hub, which is
represented by the EU 15, and the spoke countries, which are represented by the EFTA, BAFTA
CEFTA and MED countries. Notice that the ROO Index variable captures also the e⁄ect of the
preferential tari⁄. For this reason the e⁄ect of ROO Index variable in our estimation strategy needs
to be interpreted as the overall e⁄ect of being part of the same FTA. We decided to omit preferential
tari⁄ for two main reasons: ￿rstly preferential tari⁄ would have been highly correlated with the ROO
Index used and secondly due to the many missing values contained in the data on preferential tari⁄.
We intentionally analyze the trade pattern in the PECS zone by looking separately at the export
from the EU 15 to the FTA partners and vice-versa. Finally, we look at the export among the EFTA,
BAFTA, CEFTA and MED countries. We provide separate analysis since the model predicts di⁄erent
e⁄ect according to the direction of trade. The introduction of relaxed ROOs seems to increase trade
in intermediate goods among the peripheral (spoke) countries. Figure 3 gives an idea of the e⁄ect of
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Average Roo faced by export
totalintermediatedummy Average Roo
Average ROO after 1997
Czech Republic number of exported products
The y axis measures the number of products exported by the Czech Republic to the EFTA, BAFTA,
CEFTA countries in each year under study, while the x axis shows the average ROO Index faced by
these products. The ROO Index has been developed by de Melo et al. (2007) and represents the
restrictiveness of ROO imposed by the EU to its FTA partners. This Index varies from 1 to 7, with 7
being the higher value associated with more restrictive ROOs. The graph provides an example of the
di¢ culty faced by peripheral countries to couple with restrictive ROOs. Since ROOs are more di¢ cult
to comply with, the number of intermediates exported to other peripheral countries decreases with
ROOs (red line). After 1997, when the Czech Republic has already signed a great part of cumulation
agreements, the number of intermediate goods exported to the peripheral countries is still decreasing
with ROOs, but to a lesser extent (green line).
In order to examine whether the pattern of trade follows the theoretical predictions, we bring the
model to the data. To do this we follow the two steps procedure adopted by HMR (2008) in order
to correct for the sample selection e⁄ects and the presence of ￿rms heterogeneity. Di⁄erently from
21HMR, we applied the strategy using the HS 1992 classi￿cation, which disaggregates trade ￿ ows across
5019 tari⁄ lines. In the following sections, we highlight the empirical strategy and the econometric
speci￿cation of the model. In section 5.2 we provide the results that follow from the empirical setting
and a comparison with the theoretical predictions.
5.1 Two Steps Procedure
Using a two step procedure we estimate the e⁄ect on trade of more relaxed ROOs. We consider
separately changes in hub-spoke, spoke-hub and spoke-spoke trade as a consequence of ROOs with
diagonal cumulation. To avoid the classical mistake we follow HMR to consider the ￿rm heterogeneity
aspect.
The ￿st step of this procedure consists in estimating the extensive margin of trade, i.e. the proba-
bility of exporting. Generally, the latent variable is determined by:
y￿
odkt = x￿ + eodkt
where y￿
odkt represents the pro￿t from exporting, o and d represent the origin and the destination
country, k the tari⁄line at the HS6 (1992) and t the year, where x￿ equal to ￿1+￿2xodkt+:::+￿kxodkt.
Following our theoretical model, positive trade ￿ ows are observed if ￿rms export at least under MFN,
since this represents the highest unit input requirement needed to become an exporter. Meaning that
pro￿ts from export are positive only if the unit input requirement of the ￿rm is lower than the export
cuto⁄in 11. Since we do not observe the export cuto⁄we thus associate the presence of positive export
pro￿ts with positive trade ￿ ows. Hence, we choose as an indicator variable yodkt. When yodkt = 1 we









We can easily obtain the distribution of yodkt given x:
Pr(yodkt = 1jx) = Pr(y￿
odkt > 0jx) = Pr(x￿ + eodkt > 0jx)
= Pr(eodkt > ￿(x￿)jx) = 1 ￿ ￿(￿x￿) =￿(x￿) (18)
22this represents the probability that country o exports to d, conditional on the observed variables,
where ￿(:) is the cdf of the unit-normal distribution.
To simplify notation, we follow HMR in assuming the existence of a lower bound in the Pareto
distribution17. More speci￿cally, we set G(a) = (ak ￿ ak
L)=(ak
D ￿ ak
L); k > (￿ ￿ 1): As HMR, we
allow for ax < aL for some o-d pairs, inducing zero export from d to o18. This speci￿cation allows for
asymmetric bilateral trade ￿ ows including zeros.
We de￿ne yodkt as ratio between the export cuto⁄ ax and the lower bound, aL.
Using 11 and the relationship existing between (3) and (4), we can express the probability of
observing positive trade ￿ ows as follows19:















where Bd = A=P
1￿￿
f;d and A = (￿E=￿)(￿=1 ￿ ￿)
1￿￿ and ￿ ￿ (2=3)
￿20: Equation (19) is the ratio of the
variable export pro￿ts for the most productive ￿rm, i.e. with a = aL, to the ￿xed export costs. Hence,
we observe positive exports only when the elements inside ￿ end up being larger than one. Using this
speci￿cation we can rewrite the latent variable as:
y￿
odkt = ￿ + ￿(￿FTApM;Roo) + ￿pf;d + ’e + ￿fX
where lower case letters represent the variables in logarithmic form.
Let ^ ￿ be the predicted probability of export that is derived from equation (19), then ^ y￿
odkt = ￿￿1(^ ￿)
is the predicted value of the latent variable. ^ ￿ and ^ y￿
odkt can be used to construct the inverse Mills ratio,
^  
￿
odkt, which represent the standard Heckman correction for standard sample selection, which corrects
for the bias generated by the unobserved country pair level shocks. On the other hand, following HMR,
￿rm heterogeneity is taken into account by the introduction of the non linear term equal to the sum
of the predicted latent variable and the Mills ration, i.e. ^ y￿
odkt + ^  
￿
odkt.
Controlling for both ￿rms heterogeneity the selection of country pairs into trading partner we can
estimate the bilateral trade ￿ ow. More precisely, in our model the values of per ￿rm bilateral exports
17This assumption does not change any of our results.
18Where ax represents the cuto⁄ of being a successful exporter.









20In the same way we want to express expressing ￿MNF in terms of ￿FTA, hence ￿MNF = ￿FTA￿. This relationship








Bd￿FTA￿ if aR < a ￿ aX
v(aR) = a1￿￿P
￿(1￿￿)
M;Roo Bd￿FTA if a ￿ aR (20)
Thus the total bilateral exports will be the sum of the value of export of ￿rms that ful￿l ROOs and






























Then, assuming ￿ = (2=3)

















Taking logarithm the expression can be rewritten as:
modkt = ￿ + ￿(￿FTApM;Roo) + ￿pf;d + ’Ed + ￿u ^  
￿
odkt+ln(exp(￿(^ y￿
odkt + ^ ￿
￿
odkt) ￿ 1))
where Ed is expenditure and is proxied using nominal GDP. The price index of the ￿nal good is proxy
with importers ￿xed e⁄ect. The price index of the intermediate is proxy by exporting country dummies
and by the ROOs Index developed by de Melo et al. (2007). Since according to our model, diagonal
cumulation relaxes ROOs, we create a slope dummy by interacting the ROOs Index with a dummy
equal one when two countries can cumulate and obtain original status to enter the EU 15 market. The
dummy was generated following the EU Commission notice (2002/C 100/05).
To account for the di⁄erent predictions of the model which distinguish between intermediate and
￿nal goods, both the ROO Index and the slope dummy are interacted with a ￿nal good dummy and
an intermediate good dummy. This generates a total of four variables: the ROO Index and the slope
dummy for the intermediate good and the ROO Index and the slope dummy for the ￿nal good. This is
equivalent to running two separate regressions for the intermediate and the ￿nal good, since the e⁄ect
24of ROO is not associated with a single slope line.
The intermediate and ￿nal good dummy were generated following the CEPII classi￿cation, by
transformation level based on Broad Economic Categories of the UN. The classi￿cation divides the
products into ￿ve category: parts and accessories, processed goods, consumption , investment and
primary goods. We consider intermediate goods the ones classi￿ed as parts and accessories, processed
and investment goods. Additionally, we control for all the other supply factors by introducing the
nominal GDP of the exporting country. The ￿xed cost is proxied by the quality of legal system21.
Finally, we introduce year dummies to deal with business cycle and exchange rate ￿ uctuations.
Note, that in the Panel that looks at the exports from the EFTA, BAFTA, CEFTA and MED
countries to the EU 15, the GDP of the importing country and the importer country ￿xed e⁄ect is
captured by the year dummies. Instead, in the panel that looks at the export from the EU 15 to the
EFTA, BAFTA, CEFTA and MED countries, the GDP of the exporting country and the exporter
￿xed e⁄ect is captured by the year dummies.
5.2 Results
In the estimation procedure we divide the panel into three sub panels: export from EU 15 to the
EFTA, BAFTA CEFTA and MED countries (called exports from hub to spoke), exports from these
last countries to the EU 15 (called exports from spoke to hub), and ￿nally the exports among FTAs
(called exports among spoke).
In Tables 1, 2 and 3 we report the results of the ￿rst step procedure: the extensive margin of
trade. These tables show the probability of exporting from hub to spoke, the probability of exporting
from spoke to hub and the probability of exporting among spokes respectively. In Table 4 and 5 are
provided the results concerning the second step procedure: the intensive margin of trade.
The model prediction concerning the exports from hub to spoke is that diagonal cumulation leads
to an increase in the extensive margin of the ￿nal good. As anticipated above, we do not have any
theoretical prediction regarding the intermediate good. Table 1, which tests the implication of the
hub and spoke trade, con￿rms the theoretical prediction on the ￿nal good. The introduction of PECS
has increased the probability of exporting the ￿nal good. Concerning the probability of exporting the
intermediate, our result suggests that diagonal cumulation has worsened the likelihood of exporting the
intermediate. Additionally, the result shows that the restrictiveness of ROOs restrain the probability
21See the Appendix 4 for data source
25of exporting the intermediate good by the EU 15, while it increases the probability of exporting the
￿nal good. An increase in the ROOs leads to a 0.4% decrease in intermediate trade, while it increases
by 1% the probability of exporting the ￿nal good.
The model￿ s prediction concerning the exports from spoke to hub is that diagonal cumulation in-
creases the extensive margin of trade of the ￿nal good. We also expect that there will be a similar e⁄ect
on the extensive and intensive margins of the intermediate. In Table 2 we explore these predictions. In
line with the theoretical predictions we ￿nd that restrictive ROOs increase the probability that EFTA,
BAFTA, CEFTA and MED countries export the intermediate as well as the ￿nal good. More precisely
the probability of exporting the intermediate good to the EU 15 increases by 1%, and by 0.5% for the
￿nal. Di⁄erently from the results in Table 1, the probability of exporting from the spoke to the hub
country increases for both the ￿nal and the intermediate good with restrictive ROOs.
According to our results, the restrictive ROOs have di⁄erent e⁄ect on the hub and on the spoke
countries. For the hub countries, EU 15, the restrictive ROOs lead to an increase in trade only in
￿nal goods. For the spoke countries, the restrictive ROOs have a stronger impact on the intermediate
sector. This suggests a reorganization of production as a consequence of the FTAs, where the EU 15
shifted the intermediate stage of production to peripheral countries.
A comparison between Table 1 and 2 highlights that the introduction of PECS seems to have
accentuated the reorganization of production through the relaxation of ROOs. The total e⁄ect of
ROOs, i.e. the sum of the ROO Index and the interaction term between the ROO Index and the
Pan-European dummy, leads to a 1.1% increase in the probability that the hub exports the ￿nal good,
while it decreases by 0.6% the probability of exporting. If we compare these results with the ones form
Table 2, we can conclude that EFTA, BAFTA and CEFTA countries have gained the most from the
possibility to diagonally cumulate. Indeed, the total probability of exporting the intermediate goods
to the EU 15 has increased by 2% and by 1.5% for the ￿nal good. This last e⁄ect can be explained by
the bene￿cial e⁄ect of diagonal versus bilateral cumulation.
The reason behind these results relies on the pattern of trade in Europe in the period under con-
sideration. The establishment of a FTA with bilateral ROOs seems to have decreased the intermediate
trade among spoke countries. Conversely, the introduction of diagonal cumulation leads to an increase
in both ￿nal and intermediate good trade among spoke countries. The decrease in the price of the in-
termediate good, allows producers to use cheaper intermediates and still qualify for preferential access.
This boosts ￿nal good trade also between the hub and the spoke countries.
26The last prediction of the model concerns the e⁄ect of diagonal cumulation in the spoke-spoke trade.
In the theoretical model we ￿nd that relaxing ROOs increases the spoke-spoke exports. Table 3, which
tests the implication of the spoke-spoke trade, con￿rms these theoretical predictions. ROOs without
diagonal cumulation restrain the probability of exporting the intermediate good among peripheral
countries by 0.1%. The introduction of diagonal cumulation reverts this e⁄ect: diagonal cumulation
increases by 0.2% the probability of exporting the intermediate good. Hence, the total e⁄ect of ROOs
on the intermediate good is positive. Moreover, the total e⁄ect of ROOs on the ￿nal good adds up to
0.25% increase.
Concerning the e⁄ects of all the other variables, signs are as expected and all the coe¢ cients are
signi￿cant. Distance a⁄ects negatively the probability of export. Spoke countries not belonging to
the same FTA are less likely to trade, while belonging to the same FTA increases the probability of
export. Moreover, higher GDP of both the importing and exporting countries raises the probability of
positive trade. Finally, the quality of the legal system, which in our estimation strategy represents the
￿xed cost, has a strong and positive e⁄ect on the probability of exporting. The average e⁄ect varies
from 14% in the case of export from spoke to hub to 0.2% in the case of spoke-spoke trade. In line
with HMR, the selection bias term as well as the heterogeneity term is positive and highly signi￿cant
in all the panels analyzed. This implies that heterogeneous ￿rms are indeed playing an important role
in explaining trade ￿ ows, con￿rming that gravity equations should account for these factors.
Table 4 reports the second step estimation results for trade ￿ ows from hub to spoke countries. In
Table 5 we have similar results for the export from the spoke to hub. Due to large amount of data
involved in the spoke to spoke panel (more than 15 million data points), we were unable to perform
this last step procedure for trade ￿ ows among spokes.
Trade volumes for both the intermediate and the ￿nal goods increase with ROOs and the e⁄ect is
accentuated by diagonal cumulation. The volume of exports from the hub to the spoke increases by 17%
for the intermediate good and by 8% for the ￿nal good. Considering Table 5, trade ￿ ows from spoke to
hub country increase as well: by 10% for the intermediate and by 2.1% for the ￿nal good. Comparing
the results of the second step with the ￿rst step procedure, all the signs are preserved for the ￿nal
good as predicted by our model. It is worthwhile to notice that the e⁄ect of restrictive ROOs on the
intermediate good exported from the hub to the spoke has a di⁄erent sign for the extensive and intensive
margins. It seems that restrictive ROOs has reduced the number of intermediate varieties exported by
the hub while increase the volume of the already exported intermediates. A potential reason behind
27this result could be attributed to the production shift from the hub to the spoke countries. This
production shift could have occurred through the establishment of subsidiaries, leading to an increase
in intra-￿rm trade.
Robustness checks
Table 6 to 11 show some sensitivity analysis. We perform two types of robustness checks: a logit and a
tobit estimation. Logit estimations represent the probability of exporting and thus, look at the e⁄ects
at the extensive margin of trade. Logit estimates con￿rm the results of the probit estimations. The
only exception concerns the e⁄ect of being part to the same FTA in the case of spoke to spoke trade.
There is not a rule of thumb for deciding whether logit or probit procedure should be preferred. We
choose probit due to the fact that the normal distribution can be linked to the pareto distribution.
Turning to tobit estimates, results are con￿rmed. As in the previous section, the only exception
concerns the e⁄ect of ROOs on the export of the intermediate good from the hub to the spoke. This
exception could be linked to the previous results. Remember that the tobit regression represents the
combined e⁄ect of the explanatory variables on both margins. In the previous section, we found that
ROOs has a di⁄erent e⁄ect on the extensive and intensive margin of the intermediate good exported
from the hub to the spoke. Hence, tobit results would suggest that the intensive margin is more
important than the extensive margin in explaining trade ￿ ows. This ￿nding is con￿rmed by Hummels
(), Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) and Brenton and Newfarmer (2007), which show that the intensive
margin predominate the extensive margin in explaining trade ￿ ows.
6 Conclusion
Our paper makes four contributions to the literature. First, on the theory front, we analyse the impact
of relaxing rules of origin (ROOs) in a simple setting with heterogeneous ￿rms that buy intermediate
inputs from domestic and foreign sources. In particular, we consider the impact of switching from
bilateral to diagonal cumulation when using preferences (instead of paying the MFN tari⁄) involves a
￿xed cost. Due to this, relaxing the restrictiveness of the ROOs by moving to diagonal cumulation can
move the extensive export margin in the opposite direction, i.e. liberalisation leads the least productive
exporters to stop exporting. The reason is that wider cumulation boosts the competitiveness of the
￿rms that are large enough to be constrained by them and this increased competitiveness pushes out
the marginal exporters.
28Second, empirically we are the ￿rst to estimate trade e⁄ects using the most recent techniques
developed by Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2007) on highly disaggregated data (HS6 digit). We
show that the introduction of the Pan-European Cumulation System (PECS) has a positive e⁄ect on
both the extensive and intensive margin of trade. This result is particularly strong for the Spoke
countries who belong to the diagonal cumulation zone. In relation to Spoke to Spoke trade, the
PECS reverses the negative impact of strict ROOs on intermediate trade which turns positive as a
consequence of introducing diagonal ROCs.
Third, our particular application of HMR concerns the impact of rules of origin (ROOs). We
￿nd that relaxing the restrictiveness of ROOs by switching to diagonal cumulation increases trade,
particularly among ￿ spoke￿countries. The e⁄ect is particularly marked for intermediate goods; a result
that suggests the ROOs were hindering the e¢ cient organization of international supply networks.
Fourth, our paper is the most comprehensive analysis to date of the trade e⁄ects of the Pan-European
Cumulation System.
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31Appendix
A.1. Regularity Condition
We discuss the condition which ensures that the operating pro￿ts from exporting under FTA is greater






















this can be rewritten as
1 > ￿FTA > (3=2)
￿ ￿MFN
when this condition holds we have that O￿d
R > O￿d
X, which ensures no deviations.
A.2. Free Entry and Price Index
Using the equilibrium cuto⁄s and the Pareto distributiuon we can rewrite (13) and (14) as:
￿ ￿ 1




















































Then we solve this system of equations for B￿
s and B￿
h to obtain closed form solutions for the
cut-o⁄s.
After substituting in the Price indeces, 15 and 16, the closed form solutions for the cuto⁄s, 10-12,
together with the solutions for B￿s, we can solve for the number of varieties produced in each countries.
32A.3. ROOs with Diagonal Cumulation
The model is similar to the one solved before, what changes are the price indeces of the intermediates






A.4. Extensive and Intensive Margins
The value of exports of a typical R-type ￿rm tends to in￿nity as ￿ a￿approaches zero, while for inter-





























































The change in the total value of exports can be demposed in the following margins:
￿v (a) = ￿ (value per exporter)
| {z }
Intensive Margin
+ ￿ (# exporters) ￿ own value
| {z }
Extensive Margin
Using (25) and (26) we can derive the extensive and intensive margins of trade for R and X types of





























exp represents the number of exporting ￿rms in the di⁄erent scenarios: with ROOs
and when ROOs are relaxed. These margines are calculated for R-type ￿rms in spoke and in hub
countries, as well as for X-type ￿rms in spoke countries exporting to the hub and X-type ￿rms in
spoke countries exporting to the spokes.




Czech Republic Jordan Slovak Republic
Egypt Latvia Slovenia
Estonia Lebanon Switzerland
EU 15 Lituania Tunisia
Hungary Norway Turkey
Data
Export (1992 HS6): CEPII (2008): BACI database
GDP (current USD): World Bank (2008): World Development Indicators
Rules of Origin Index*: Cadot O., Carrère C., de Melo J. and Bolormaa T. (2005)
Rules of Law Indicator: World Bank (2007): Governance Indicator
Data Period: 1995-2002








Ln GDP importer 0.488* 0.069*
Roo intermediate good -0.027* -0.004*
Roo final good 0.075* 0.010*
PanEuropean*Roo intermediate good -0.011* -0.002*
PanEuropean*Roo final good 0.005* 0.0008*
Rule of law 0.156* 0.022*
Number of observations 753920












Ln GDP exporter 0.273* 0.108*
Roo intermediate good 0.029* 0.011*
Roo final good 0.012* 0.005*
PanEuropean*Roo intermediate good 0.023* 0.009*
PanEuropean*Roo final good 0.024* 0.010*
Rule of law 0.361* 0.142*
Number of observations 762584




Constant, Exporter year and sector fixed effects not reported
35Table 3
Probit estimate
Dependent variable: Export dummy Spoke Spoke
Raw Marginal
coefficients effects
Ln GDP exporter 0.122* 0.010*
Ln GDP importer 0.314* 0.026*
Roo intermediate good -0.014* -0.0012*
Roo final good 0.006* 0.0005*
PanEuropean*Roo intermediate good 0.024* 0.002*
PanEuropean*Roo final good 0.025* 0.002*
common FTAs 0.090* 0.008**
not common FTAs -0.206* -0.016*
Rule of law 0.050* 0.004*
lndistance -0.619* -0.051*
Number of observations 13721040




Constant, Exporter, Importer, year and sector fixed effects not
reported
Table 4 and 5: Non Linear
Second step: Non linear least square
Dependent variable: Ln Export from Hub to Spoke
Raw Marginal
coefficients effects
Ln GDP importer 0.439*
Roo intermediate good 0.114*
Roo final good 0.026*
PanEuropean*Roo intermediate good 0.056*
PanEuropean*Roo final good 0.054*
eta 145.685*
w 41.046*
Number of observations 13721040
Adj R squared 0.3492
Constant, Importer, year and sector fixed effects not reported
Second step: Non linear least square
Dependent variable: Ln Export from Spoke to Hub
Raw Marginal
coefficients effects
Ln GDP exporter 0.620*
Roo intermediate good 0.076*
Roo final good 0.019*
PanEuropean*Roo intermediate good 0.025*
PanEuropean*Roo final good 0.002*
eta 58.527*
w 18.26*
Number of observations 13721040
Adj R squared 0.3889
Constant, Exporter, year and sector fixed effects not reported
36Tables 6
Logit estimate




Ln GDP importer 0.843* 0.053*
Roo intermediate good -0.050* -0.003*
Roo final good 0.137* 0.009*
PanEuropean*Roo intermediate good -0.016* -0.001*
PanEuropean*Roo final good 0.013* 0.001*
Rule of law 0.240* 0.015*
Number of observations 753920
Pseudo R squared 0.2245
Log Likelihood -235719.56








Ln GDP exporter 0.444* 0.109*
Roo intermediate good 0.052* 0.013*
Roo final good 0.024* 0.005*
PanEuropean*Roo intermediate good 0.036* 0.009*
PanEuropean*Roo final good 0.038* 0.009*
Rule of law 0.614* 0.151*
Number of observations 762584
Pseudo R squared 0.279
Log Likelihood -379399.3
Constant, Exporter year and sector fixed effects not reported
37Table 8
Logit estimate
Dependent variable: Export dummy Spoke Spoke
Raw Marginal
coefficients effects
Ln GDP exporter 0.320* 0.001*
Ln GDP importer 0.607* 0.020*
Roo intermediate good -0.015* -0.0005*
Roo final good 0.012* 0.0004*
PanEuropean*Roo intermediate good 0.022* 0.0007*
PanEuropean*Roo final good 0.036* 0.001*
common FTAs -0.017** -0.0006**
not common FTAs -0.513* -0.017*
Rule of law 0.107* 0.003*
lndistance -1.210* -0.040*
Number of observations 13721040















Ln GDP importer 1.018* 0.832* 0.613* 0.105*
Roo intermediate good 0.015* 0.013* 0.009* 0.002*
Roo final good 0.161* 0.132* 0.097* 0.017*
PanEuropean*Roo intermediate good 0.002* 0.003* 0.002* 0.004*
PanEuropean*Roo final good 0.039* 0.033* 0.024* 0.004*
Rule of law 0.418* 0.345* 0.254* 0.043*
Number of observations 753920




Constant, Exporter, Importer, year and sector fixed effects not reported
38Table 10
Tobit estimate







Ln GDP exporter 0.848* 0.435* 0.314* 0.090*
Roo intermediate good 0.133* 0.068* 0.049* 0.014*
Roo final good 0.036* 0.019* 0.014* 0.004*
PanEuropean*Roo intermediate good 0.035* 0.018* 0.013* 0.004*
PanEuropean*Roo final good 0.021* 0.011* 0.008* 0.002*
Rule of law 1.184* 0.607* 0.439* 0.126*
Number of observations 762584




Constant, Exporter year and sector fixed effects not reported
Table 11
Tobit estimate







Ln GDP exporter 0.586* 0.050* 0.094* 0.021*
Ln GDP importer 1.182* 0.100* 0.189* 0.041*
Roo intermediate good -0.042* -0.003* -0.007* -0.001*
Roo final good 0.035* 0.003* 0.006* 0.001*
PanEuropean*Roo intermediate good 0.080* 0.007* 0.013* 0.003*
PanEuropean*Roo final good 0.097* 0.008* 0.016* 0.003*
common FTAs 0.345* 0.030* 0.055* 0.012*
not common FTAs -0.833* -0.070* -0.134* -0.030*
Rule of law 0.147* 0.012* 0.024* 0.005*
lndistance -2.626* -0.222* -0.421* -0.092*
Number of observations 15251680




Constant, Exporter, Importer, year and sector fixed effects not reported
39